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Britain has entered the World Trade Organisation system as an independent player.
One of the next big things on the WTO’s agenda is to decide on the rules that will
govern digital trade. In the  rst of a series of posts, Steve Woolcock (LSE)
discusses the state of the plurilateral negotiations taking place between 86 WTO
Members including the US, the EU, and China on the future of the international
trading system.
The growth of digital trade can be seen as the latest phase of globalisation. In the
period after the establishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) in 1948 it was trade in goods that raised questions about the balance
between open markets and regulatory sovereignty. In the period after 1979, it was
foreign direct investment.  In the 2020s it will be digital trade. Digital trade is
growing from an estimated US$ 150 bn in 1999 to US$ 26 tn in 2019 and growing at
8% a year.  In 2019 digital trade was put at an estimated 6 per cent and rising of
global exports. The COVID pandemic has accelerated the trend with on-line sales
increasing further from the 17 per cent of global retail they were in 2020. This
growth in digital trade raises questions about the su ciency and suitability of
existing trade rules, such as the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
that was negotiated in the 1990s, before the advent of the internet. But the current
effort to de ne ambitious but inclusive rules for digital trade comes at a time when
the international trading system in the shape of the World Trade Organisation
(WTO) is going through its most troubled period since 1948. Strategic competition
– essentially concerning China – and the political and security implications of the
use of data are also a signi cant complicating factor.
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This growth in digital trade also has implications for political economy on the
balance of costs and bene ts of engaging in international trade. Physical goods
that used to cross borders and be subject to tariffs are increasingly digitalised,
which bene ts human capital-rich economies but reduces tariff revenue for
developing countries. The provision of services that once required a physical
presence in a market, such as banking or business services, are increasingly
digitally enabled. As a result, the broad balance of bene ts between countries
incorporated in the schedules of commitments to open trade in services in the
GATS is in danger of being undermined. Digitalisation and the growth of digital
platforms such as Google, Facebook and Amazon also have distributive effects
within national economies as they gain at the expense of established, conventional
suppliers.  For example, Amazon’s growth at the expenses of high street retailers.
Whilst there have been discussions on e-commerce in the WTO since 1998, the
current e-commerce negotiations started with a ‘Joint Statement Initiative’ (JSI) in
2017 supported by a group of 71 WTO members that has subsequently expanded
to 86. The agenda includes the very practical means of facilitating digital trade such
as recognising e-signatures as equivalent to ‘signed documents’ or efforts to
streamline border controls by introducing digital trade documentation. It also
covers consumer protection online, anti-fraud and anti-spam provisions and the
much more sensitive question of personal data protection. As in any ‘trade’
agreement market access is on the table in the form of free cross border data
 ows, fair access to networks including those operated by the digital platforms.
However, when dealing with access to digital markets, the state is concerned about
the political and security implications of wide access to the endless  ow of data
and information. The challenge, therefore, is to balance domestic concerns with
data privacy, cybersecurity and market access.  Some parties to the negotiations
also wish to protect certain commercially strategic activities from international
competition. The table lists the main topics raised by the series of position papers
submitted to the WTO.
With the stagnation of multilateral negotiations on trade in the so-called Doha
Development Agenda (DDA), the question is whether progress can be made in
digital trade with fewer than the total 164 WTO members involved, albeit when
these account for 90 per cent of world trade? This format of ‘likeminded’ countries
negotiating is termed a plurilateral negotiation. It is favoured by those WTO
members that wish to press ahead with the negotiation of ‘high standard’ rules for
digital trade.  The di culty of course is that there are different views on what these
standards should be. In very broad terms these different approaches can be
characterised as follows:  the USA approach could be said to be industry-led
liberalisation with US origin companies having a  rst-mover advantage in much of
the digital sector. The EU is pursuing a more state-and-market led approach in that
it sees the creation of a Digital Single Market in the EU as the best means of
achieving the right balance between liberalisation and regulation. China, the third of
the so-called ‘three digital realms’ is pursuing a much more state-led approach.
Many developing countries remain uncertain of the costs and bene ts of digital
trade rules and are concerned about  nding themselves on the other side of a
permanent digital divide in the world economy.
Although the USA, EU and China, as well as a number of other OECD and developing
countries, are involved in the JSI negotiations, India and South Africa have come
out against such a plurilateral approach on the grounds that it undermines
multilateralism. These two countries, along with other developing economies are
concerned that the rules for such a vital and growing area of the economy should
not be shaped by the more developed economies as they would argue was the case
for goods and services. The challenge, therefore, is to  nd a balance between the
desire for a rigorous set of ‘high standard’ rules that will provide the predictability
needed for digital trade to grow on the one hand and the need to be inclusive of
economies at different levels of development on the other?
If a way forward cannot be found at a multilateral level the expectation must be that
preferential agreements will be seen as the best alternative, as has been the case in
other areas of trade and investment over the past 20 years. In this respect the three
‘realms’ approximated by the divergent approaches to the topic centred around the
US, EU and China will be important. The US has already established a relatively high
standard agreement in the renegotiated North American Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
now entitled US-Mexico-Canada (USMCA). The US has also had a major role in
shaping the Comprehensive and Progressive Transpaci c Partnership (CPTPP).
The Trump Administration withdrew from this, but the e-commerce chapter remains
that negotiated with the US included. The EU preferential trade agreements have yet
to include extensive, comprehensive provisions on digital trade, due to the desire to
de ne common EU standards  rst. China’s much more limited approach to
commitments on digital trade are arguably compatible with the e-commerce
chapter in the Regional Comprehensive Partnership Agreement (RCEP). This was
recently adopted, but only after India opted out, in part due to the provisions on e-
commerce.
The JSI along with other plurilateral agreements are on the trade agenda leading up
to the next WTO Ministerial Conference scheduled for later this year. Progress on all
the issues above is very unlikely,  but keeping the show on the road will be
important for the future of the international trading system.
This blog post introduces a series on digital trade that emanates from an extended
and detailed simulation of the current WTO negotiations on e-commerce by LSE
Masters students in the International Relations Department. This is the  rst of a
series of posts informed by these discussions.
This post represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the Brexit blog, nor
of the LSE. 
[1] Digital trade here means trade in physical goods via the internet, as well as trade
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